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Abstract
This article discusses in detail the content and context of China’s recent sentencing reform 
and its social, political, and criminal justice implications, as well as its limitations. The 
focus of China’s criminal justice reforms over the past 37 years has been predominantly 
on the trial process; the sentencing process has been largely neglected. Revelations of 
widespread sentencing inconsistency led the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) to initiate 
sentencing reform in 2005. The intent of the reform was to promote transparency 
in the sentencing process, ensure consistency in sentencing dispositions, and guard 
against inappropriate judicial leniency and severity via new sentencing procedural rules 
and guidelines limiting judges’ sentencing discretion. In addition to discussing the new 
sentencing procedures and guidelines, this article also examines some hotly debated 
issues, including whether China’s sentencing process should be completely separate 
from the trial process; the meaning of ‘sentencing consistency’ in the context of China’s 
social and political development; and China’s unique sentencing principles in comparison 
with the practice of some English-speaking jurisdictions.
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criminal justice system, sentencing reform, judges’ sentencing discretion, sentencing 
guidelines
The promulgation of the Chinese Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law in 1979 
was an important first step in the long process of China’s criminal justice reform. During 
the past 37 years, both laws have been revised repeatedly with the intention of bringing 
China’s criminal justice system in line with international standards of due process and 
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human rights protection, and with ‘a long-term goal’ of achieving the rule of law.1 However, 
some Western observers are critical of the reforms, arguing that despite what is written 
on paper, little has changed in practice. They are concerned with China’s instrumentalist 
approach to criminal justice where the criminal process has been used first and foremost 
as a tool for the politics of maintaining social stability and harmony at the expense of due 
process and human rights protection.2 For instance, Stanley Lubman critically assessed 
China’s criminal process reforms in 1999, stating that the Chinese criminal process 
remains dominated not only by the police but also by a blatant instrumentalism that puts 
it at the service of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and political leaders when they 
wish to use it. Reforms both in substantive criminal law and criminal procedure have 
edged the system toward greater tolerance for the rights of criminal defendants, but have 
not adequately institutionalized protection for those rights.3 Benjamin Liebman in 2009 
continued to criticize the instrumentalist approach to law in China’s legal reforms by 
noting that ‘an instrumentalist approach to law continues to dominate, with law often 
following, rather than leading, changes in state policy’.4
The Chinese instrumentalist approach to criminal justice profoundly affected past 
reforms of the criminal process. Criminal processes in most jurisdictions consist primar-
ily of two related but somewhat separate processes: a trial process for determining 
whether the defendant is guilty of the charged offence, and a sentencing process for 
determining a fit punishment for the convicted offender.5 One of the major flaws of 
China’s criminal process reform in the past decades was that the reform focused exclu-
sively on the trial process; the sentencing process was completely overlooked until very 
recently. The instrumentalist nature of the Chinese criminal justice system persistently 
emphasized the importance of securing criminal convictions over the protection of rights 
of the accused and gave sentencing judges flexibility in meting out criminal sanctions 
purposely for the maintenance of public order and social stability. As a result, sentencing 
was treated as a minor part of the trial process; the independent and transparent proce-
dures for sentencing were completely lacking, and sentencing dispositions were often 
grossly inconsistent, unfair, and unjustifiable.6
In recent years, widespread inconsistencies in sentencing dispositions have been 
revealed. This systemic sentencing problem has been regarded by Chinese jurists as one 
of the main sources of unfairness, injustice and corruption in the criminal process. The 
problem is so pervasive and detrimental that the public has questioned the legitimacy of 
China’s judicial system and the rule of law reforms; dissatisfaction with sentencing dis-
positions has even been considered a possible source of social instability.7 As a result, in 
recent years, the Chinese judicial authorities have been forced to reform the sentencing 
practices. Chinese jurists see the current sentencing reform initiative as a positive 
response to China’s sentencing problems, while Western scholars on Chinese criminal 
justice have thus far paid little attention to the ongoing reform. This article examines the 
content and context of the recent sentencing reform and discusses its social, political, and 
criminal justice implications, as well as its limitations.
In the late 1990s, Chinese jurists began to realize that the unbridled sentencing discre-
tion of judges and the lack of transparency in the sentencing process were directly 
responsible for widespread inconsistency and unfairness in sentencing dispositions 
across the country. Empirical studies repeatedly revealed that some minor offenders were 
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punished heavily while serious offenders were punished leniently. At the same time, dif-
ferent offenders who committed similar offences in similar circumstances were often 
punished differently, even when those offenders were sentenced in the same city, and 
occasionally by the same judge in the same court.8
The well-publicized ‘Xu Ting case’ is a good illustration of the severity of the sen-
tencing problem. In 2006, Xu Ting, a migrant worker in Guangzhou, unlawfully took 
RMB 175,000 (about US$24,300) from a malfunctioning automatic teller machine 
(ATM). Xu Ting was later charged and convicted of stealing money from a financial 
institution and received a sentence of life imprisonment. Around the same time, a senior 
government official, who misappropriated and embezzled RMB 2.4 billion (about 
US$350 million), received a sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. The striking contrast 
between the two sentences infuriated the public. Under intense public scrutiny and pres-
sure, the appellate court reduced Xu Ting’s life sentence to five years’ imprisonment. It 
has been reported that many similar cases exist.9 The inconsistent sentencing disposi-
tions have had serious social and political repercussions. The public suspect judges of 
not only abusing their sentencing power but of wider judicial corruption as well.10
According to Chen Ruihua, sentencing problems are primarily due to the Chinese 
criminal justice system’s overemphasis on its function of ‘securing criminal convictions 
over sentencing’ (重定罪轻量刑) for the purpose of social protection.11 For this same 
reason, the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law and the 1997 Criminal Law, and their subse-
quent revisions, outline relatively developed procedures for the trial process for criminal 
conviction but hardly any rules for the sentencing process.12 The absence of guidelines 
for judges on the use of their discretionary sentencing power combined with a secretive 
sentencing process has led to inconsistencies in sentencing dispositions.
In the late 1990s many local courts, seriously troubled by the lack of legislative guid-
ance in sentencing and the widespread public accusations of judicial incompetence and 
corruption, began to search for solutions to the sentencing problems.13 As a result, some 
local courts, such as Jiangyan City Intermediate Court in Jiangsu Province and Ningde 
City Intermediate Court in Fujian Province, created in-house sentencing guidelines.14 At 
the same time, many prosecutors also made efforts to hold judges accountable for their 
sentencing decisions; they frequently made sentencing recommendations to sentencing 
judges and asked the judges to provide explanations in those cases where the recommen-
dations were not adopted.15
Aware of initiatives by local courts to address deficiencies in sentencing, during the 
period of 2004 to 2010 the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC (SPC) organized a series of 
sentencing research projects and pilot programmes that began the current sentencing 
reform. In 2004, the SPC proposed to reform the sentencing process in the Second Five- 
Year People’s Court Reform Outline.16 The SPC produced a draft of sentencing guidelines 
in 2005, and 12 local courts in different regions were assigned to test them during 2008 and 
2009. From 2009 to 2010, 120 courts across China were added to the experiment. Given 
the positive results of this endeavour, and with the approval of the Politico-Legal Committee 
under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (then headed by recently 
disgraced Zhou Yongkang), the SPC, along with other government ministries, issued two 
key sentencing reform documents in July 2010: Opinions on Several Issues Concerning 
Standardization of the Sentencing Procedures (trial implementation) (关于规范量刑程序
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若干问题的意见 (试行)) and Opinions on People’s Court Sentencing Guidelines (trial 
implementation) (人民法院量刑指导意见 (试行)).17 The former document provides new 
procedural rules for sentencing and the latter document sets sentencing guidelines. Both 
documents were issued as judicial interpretations and were implemented on a trial basis 
during the period of 2010–13.18 In late 2013, the SPC reissued the sentencing guidelines 
and instructed courts at all levels to implement them nationally on a permanent basis, effec-
tive 1 January 2014.19 These sentencing procedures have retained their status as trial-
implementation procedures up to the present day. In order to fully appreciate the significance 
of the current sentencing reforms, it is necessary to discuss briefly the sentencing practices 
that preceded them.
Secretive sentencing process before the reforms
Before the 2010 sentencing reform, one of the major problems associated with the sen-
tencing process was that defendants and prosecutors were not allowed to participate in 
sentencing decision-making. Sentencing was a closed and secretive process. The 1996 
Criminal Procedure Law and its 2012 revisions contain relatively detailed stipulations 
for both first and second instance trial procedures, but hardly any rules or procedures for 
the sentencing process.
Before the reforms, sentencing in China was routinely carried out as a minor part of 
the trial process.20 Normally, in a first instance trial for a relatively serious offence, the 
trial court would be adjourned after the open court investigations and the arguments 
concerning criminal charges had concluded. The collegial panel would then convene in 
a private office to decide whether the defendant was guilty or not.21 In a case where the 
defendant was found guilty, the collegial panel would immediately proceed to determine 
punishment without any involvement of the parties concerned. After making a prelimi-
nary sentencing decision, the presiding judge of the panel would then submit the sentenc-
ing decision to the divisional chief judge or the adjudication committee of the criminal 
division of the court, or both. If the case were important and complex, the preliminary 
sentencing decision would have to be submitted to the adjudication committee of the 
court for discussion and a final decision. Upon final approval of the sentencing decision 
by the court president and/or the adjudication committee of the court, the collegial panel 
would reconvene the court and announce the guilty verdict and the sentencing decision 
at the same time, but would not normally provide any explanation of why the sentence 
imposed had been chosen.22
Chinese jurists criticized this closed and secretive sentencing process and its lack of 
judicial independence;23 the final sentencing decision was not decided by a presiding 
judge or the collegial panel, but by the court president and/or the adjudication committee 
of the court. Many Chinese jurists went further in their criticisms; they argued that the 
previous sentencing process was ‘administrative’ rather than judicial in nature.24 This is 
because there were no sentencing hearings and no participation of defendants, prosecu-
tors and victims in sentencing decision-making. In fact, the only opportunity that defend-
ants had to make their arguments on sentencing heard was during the trial process for 
criminal convictions. This placed many defendants in a compromising position as they 
were compelled to make arguments on sentencing while still in the process of arguing a 
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case with a not-guilty plea. Such a situation clearly contradicts the principle of the pre-
sumption of innocence in the trial process, and it fails to protect the basic rights and 
interests of the defendants. Furthermore, because the sentencing process is opaque at 
best, it is susceptible to judicial abuse of sentencing discretion and other forms of judicial 
malfeasance.25 As a result, Chinese jurists have opined that non-transparency has pro-
duced a sentencing process that is devoid of due process and procedural fairness. Indeed, 
since the sentencing outcomes of this process were rendered with little judicial opinion, 
they were inexplicable to both defendants and the wider public. Collectively, these defi-
ciencies undermined popular confidence in China’s criminal justice system, which the 
current reforms have been designed to restore through the establishment of a transparent 
sentencing process that is open to all-party participation.26
Inadequate sentencing guidance before the reforms
For many Chinese jurists, Chinese criminal legislation also fails to provide sentencing 
judges with the guidance they need to mete out just and consistent sanctions.27 In the 
Chinese Criminal Law, there are eight punishment options that cover the gamut of crimi-
nal offences.28 The sentencing problems that have arisen are primarily those concerned 
with fixed-term imprisonment, life imprisonment, and the death penalty. Based on the 
Chinese Criminal Law, many serious offences are punishable by any one of these three 
penalties. Article 232, for example, states that ‘whoever intentionally kills another is to 
be sentenced to death, life imprisonment or no less than ten years’ imprisonment; when 
the circumstances are relatively minor, he is to be sentenced to no less than three years 
and no more than ten years’ imprisonment’. Though this article lists three punishments 
for homicide – the death penalty, life imprisonment, and fixed-term imprisonment – it is 
clear that the article provides little guidance to help sentencing judges decide which 
penalty to impose. This lack of legislative guidance in sentencing, coupled with an inad-
equately trained judiciary in local courts, has obstructed the ability of judges to dispense 
sentences that are consistent, justifiable, and fair. As a result, offenders committing simi-
lar offences in similar circumstances have often been sentenced differently.
Moreover, Chinese jurists argue that such parsimonious stipulations, which tend to be 
more comprehensible to the public, have encouraged a number of judges to determine 
sentences on the basis of ‘gross estimations’ rather than quantifiable criteria. Ma Xiujuan 
points out that a gross estimations approach is too flexible as it has permitted the routine 
use of severe punishment primarily as a political expediency to maintain social order, 
stability and public support. 29 At the same time, the use of gross estimations has also led 
to overly lenient punishments, which might be the result of judicial corruption.30 
Dissatisfied defendants, angry crime victims, and prosecutors fed up with inconsistent 
penalties imposed by a secretive sentencing process have launched a large number of 
appeals against sentencing decisions. Even after the sentencing verdicts took effect, 
many defendants and victims still filed their letter of complaints (信访) with appellate 
courts to protest what they viewed as unjustifiable and inexplicable sentences.
To overcome these sentencing problems, Chinese jurists argue that sentencing guide-
lines are needed to help judges make sentencing decisions.31 Hu Yunteng, a director of 
the SPC Research Office, suggests that the UK’s sentencing guidelines could be used as 
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a model for China as they possess flexibilities in sentencing sufficient to accommodate 
China’s regionally uneven social and economic development.32 In comparison, the 
United States’ federal and state sentencing guidelines are variegated and somewhat con-
voluted for Chinese jurists.33 In an effort to address the deficiencies in both the sentenc-
ing process and the dispositions produced by the sentencing process, the SPC issued 
provisional sentencing procedural rules in 2010 and sentencing guidelines in 2013.34 
These will now be examined in turn.
The 2010 sentencing procedures
The SPC’s new sentencing procedures consist of 16 articles that are designed to promote 
transparency and procedural fairness in the sentencing process. Under the new proce-
dures, sentencing shall be conducted as a relatively separate process from the trial pro-
cess; all parties involved are provided with opportunities to participate in sentencing 
decision-making. Sentencing judges are also required to articulate their sentencing deci-
sions.35 However, there are several controversial questions concerning the new proce-
dures, such as whether the sentencing process should be partially or completely separate 
from the trial process and what role, if any, crime victims and state prosecutors should 
play in the sentencing process.
Debates about a ‘relatively’ versus ‘completely’ separated sentencing 
process
Whether China should have a separate sentencing process from the trial process is one of 
the most debated questions among Chinese jurists. Some jurists argue that China’s sen-
tencing process should be separated completely from the trial process, as in Canada and 
the United States. Chen Ruihua, for example, contends that a completely separate sen-
tencing process is needed because the facts and evidence presented at a sentencing hear-
ing differ from those presented in a trial process; a completely separate sentencing 
process, with the participation of all parties involved, could help structure and restrain 
judges’ sentencing discretion and ensure the transparency and fairness of the sentencing 
process.36
Conversely, jurists affiliated with the SPC argue for a ‘relatively separate sentencing 
process’, which was adopted by the SPC in its newly issued sentencing procedures.37 The 
problem associated with the relatively separate sentencing process is primarily concerned 
with the case where a not-guilty plea is entered. According to the SPC’s newly issued 
sentencing procedures, after the trial to determine if the defendant is guilty of the charged 
offence and without rendering a guilty or innocent verdict, the court should immediately 
proceed to collect the facts and evidence. The relatively separate sentencing process 
clearly places the defendant in a difficult catch-22 situation. If the defendant chooses to 
participate in the process of collecting sentencing-related facts and evidence immediately 
after the trial, this participation could be construed as an admission of guilt and potentially 
bias the judge’s decision. On the other hand, if the defendant chooses not to participate in 
the process, he/she would forego the opportunity to participate in sentencing decision-
making and risk having non-participation interpreted as a reluctance or refusal to 
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cooperate with the court.38 It is clear that, compared to past practice, the introduction of 
this relatively separate sentencing process clearly makes no improvement in terms of the 
defendants’ right to participate in the sentencing process. Moreover, the sentencing pro-
cess continues to be in conflict with the operation of the presumption of innocence.39
Controversies surrounding crime victims’ participation in the sentencing 
process
The new sentencing procedures allow judges to invite crime victims to submit to the 
court both their impact statements and opinions on sentencing. However, victim partici-
pation in the sentencing process is not without controversy. Hu Yunteng, for one, is wary 
of such participation. He cautions that victims of crime are often revenge-seeking and 
that their participation in the sentencing process could introduce biases that compromise 
the fairness of sentencing outcomes.40 Hu urges, therefore, that victim participation be 
channelled to advance justice in the sentencing process and not be used to quench the 
desire for retribution against offenders. Furthermore, Hu raises the concern that victims 
could incur additional pain and suffering, as well as unnecessary financial hardship, 
through their participation in the sentencing process.41 However, Chen Ruihua counters 
that victim participation is critically important to a fair sentencing process because, with-
out it, judges will not be able to appreciate fully the extent to which victims have been 
harmed by offenders.42
The roles of state prosecutors in the sentencing process
The new sentencing procedures also permit prosecutors to make sentencing submissions 
and sentencing recommendations to the court.43 Prosecutors’ sentencing recommenda-
tions are permissible in many English-speaking jurisdictions, although not in England. In 
China, it is argued that prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations could help improve 
transparency and fairness in meting out sentences, limit judges’ sentencing discretion, 
and promote public trust in the sentencing process.44
However, it is clear that some government agencies and Chinese jurists wish to set 
limits. In the process of testing the new sentencing procedures in 2011, the SPC, the 
Ministry of Public Security, and other government ministries jointly issued a notice cau-
tioning prosecutors against making sentencing recommendations in publicly sensitive and 
complicated cases, and in cases concerning national security or regional social order and 
stability.45 In addition, some jurists argue that prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations 
could interfere with judges’ sentencing authority and unbalance the distribution of power 
that exists between the prosecution and defence in the sentencing process.46 Although, on 
paper, defendants and prosecutors enjoy similar rights in the sentencing process, in reality 
many defendants are disadvantaged because they cannot obtain adequate legal representa-
tion given the shortage of criminal defence attorneys in some regions and/or the heavy 
financial costs they incur in cases where they could hire a legal attorney.47
The above suggests that, while there is a consensus about the necessity of reforming 
the sentencing process, there are disagreements as to which specific reforms should be 
adopted. China is wrestling currently with many of the same questions that have faced 
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several English-speaking jurisdictions, namely, what is the relationship between fairness 
and efficiency in the sentencing process? Whose interests are more important in the rela-
tionships between defendants and victims, and defendants and state prosecutors? How 
should these competing interests be represented in the sentencing process?48
The 2014 sentencing guidelines
The SPC recognizes that the dispensing of fair and justifiable punishments is important 
for maintaining ‘social stability and promoting social harmony’.49 For this reason, the 
current sentencing reform is also tasked with achieving consistency in sentencing dispo-
sitions. Consistency requires that offenders who commit similar offences in similar cir-
cumstances should be punished similarly. To achieve proportionality and consistency in 
sentencing, in 2013 the SPC issued Opinions Concerning Sentencing Guidelines for 
Frequently Committed Offences (关于常见犯罪的量刑指导意见; hereafter referred to 
as the guidelines).50 The guidelines consist of four sections: the guiding principles of 
sentencing; basic sentencing methodology; applications of common mitigating and 
aggravating factors; and sentences for common offences.
Sentencing principles with Chinese characteristics
The guidelines contain sentencing principles that China shares with other jurisdictions, 
such as sentencing according to the facts and laws, the maintenance of proportionality, 
and the punishment of criminals and the prevention of crime. However, the guidelines 
also contain several sentencing principles that are specific to China, including the prin-
ciple of combining positive legal outcomes and social effectiveness of punishment, the 
use of social harmfulness of an offence as a sentencing criterion, and the balancing of 
leniency and severity in punishment.51
According to the guidelines, it is imperative that sentencing dispositions obtain the 
approval of the general public and serve to protect society. This is reflected in the princi-
ple of ‘combining positive legal outcomes and social effectiveness of punishment’ (惩罚
的法律效果与社会效果相结合), which implies that the dispositions should not only 
engender a positive perception of the sentencing process and the criminal justice system 
as a whole, but also require public support and be conducive to the maintenance of social 
order and stability. Chinese emphasis on the social effectiveness of punishment in the 
sentencing process is compatible with penal populism in English-speaking jurisdic-
tions.52 This is also consistent with the Chinese criminal justice tendency to place sub-
stantive results over procedural justice.53 This principle could help explain why the 
Chinese judiciary routinely takes into account public opinion, local public order, and 
social stability conditions in their sentencing decision-making, and sometimes even uses 
public opinion as the foremost justification for unusually onerous punishments, such as 
the death penalty.54
The Chinese legal system also uses ‘the social harmfulness of an offence’ (犯罪的社
会危害程度) as a principle to guide sentencing decisions. The concept of ‘social harm-
fulness of an offence’ (which was written into both the 1979 and 1997 Criminal Laws) 
has been used in China’s criminal process as a key criterion in differentiating a criminal 
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conduct from a non-criminal one, and a serious offence from a minor one, and in deter-
mining the severity of punishment in the criminal process, at least since 1979.55 According 
to Nie Huiping, the concept was originally borrowed from the 1922 Criminal Code of the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and used for the first time in the 1950 draft 
outline of the PRC Criminal Law.56
In recent years, Chinese jurists have started to question the validity of this principle, 
doubting if it meets the test of the principle of legality and suggesting that its primary 
function is to serve as a possible source of flexibility in applying the law in the sentenc-
ing process. They argue that the concept of social harmfulness is very subjective, diffi-
cult to define and measure. Determining the social harmfulness of offences has often 
been subject to the influence of government policy expediency, and the national and 
regional social and political contexts.57 Therefore, such a criterion is not conducive to the 
establishment of sentencing fairness, consistency and uniformity.
‘Balancing leniency and severity’ (宽严相济) is another principle that informs sen-
tencing in China. This principle first appeared in a 2006 report by the SPC and Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate.58 The essence of the policy is concerned with formulating 
differential punishments for crimes of different severities rather than to offer lenient 
criminal justice treatment to all offenders. The policy directs sentencing courts to punish 
those who commit ‘serious crimes’ heavily while lenient treatment should be applied 
only to those who commit ‘minor offences’.59 However, serious crimes and minor crimes 
associated with the policy are not legally defined concepts in the Chinese Criminal Law, 
leaving the meaning and interpretation unclear. In fact, China’s changing social and 
political context often plays a decisive role in determining the seriousness of a criminal 
offence. For this reason, the severity of a crime has often been defined and redefined in 
the past to meet public expectations, changing social and political climates and party-
state policies.60 These problems associated with the policy lead one to question whether 
the renewed emphasis of the principle of balancing leniency with severity in the recent 
sentencing reforms is really all that helpful in reducing judges’ sentencing discretion and 
promoting sentencing consistency. More likely it is just another flexible device for 
Chinese authorities to use to expediently apply the sentencing guidelines and adjust the 
scale of punishment to the state of public order and social stability.
Sentencing principles are important guides to sentencing practice. Though the sen-
tencing guidelines introduce the principles that are unique to China, they provide no 
information on how these principles should be used in the sentencing decision-making 
process, nor do they specify the relationship between the different principles. At the same 
time, the principles are ambiguous in meaning and highly susceptible to contextual inter-
pretation, and therefore create flexibility in determining punishment. Thus, in the current 
stage of China’s reform, the consistent and unambiguous application of these principles 
may be difficult to accomplish under social, economic, and political conditions that are 
constantly in flux.
The new sentence calculation methodology
The new sentence calculation method is a central component of the guidelines. The method 
highlights quantification of various sentencing-related factors and calculation of three 
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interrelated sentencing components: a sentencing starting point, a baseline sentence, and a 
final sentence. Based on a sentencing starting point, a baseline sentence shall be calculated, 
and then a final sentence would be derived from an adjusted baseline sentence.
Deciding a sentencing starting point. The intent of calculating the ‘sentencing starting 
point’ in the guidelines is to give sentencing judges a point of departure from which to 
begin deriving a fit punishment.61 According to the guidelines, a sentencing starting 
point needs to be within the ranges of penalties enumerated in the Criminal Law and 
decided based on ‘the primary constituent facts of a crime’.62 Where the primary con-
stituent facts of a crime are concerned, the SPC refers specifically to both physical and 
mental aspects of a crime (i.e. actus reus and mens rea) that are explicitly stipulated in 
the Criminal Law. Having realized the difficulties in deciding a sentencing starting point, 
the guidelines provide sentencing starting points for 15 frequently committed criminal 
offences. They include traffic offences, assault causing bodily harm, rape, unlawful con-
finement, robbery, theft, and extortion. Most sentencing starting points for the 15 offences 
are set close to the minimum penalties stipulated in the Criminal Law. However, the SPC 
is quick to point out that a sentencing starting point is not and should not be the statutory 
minimum sentence of an offence.63
Calculating a baseline sentence. After having determined a sentencing starting point, the 
next critical step in a sentencing process is to decide a baseline sentence.64 According to 
the guidelines, based on a sentencing starting point, a baseline sentence should be estab-
lished by considering ‘the secondary or derived constituent facts of a crime’. These are 
the facts of a crime that are related to the constituent facts of a crime, but not explicitly 
prescribed in the Criminal Law. To facilitate judges in deciding baseline sentences, the 
SPC also describes usual secondary constituent facts for the 15 frequently committed 
criminal offences. For instance, for a traffic offence, factors such as the extent of culpa-
bility of an offender, the number of persons injured or killed, or fleeing from the scene of 
an accident could be used to determine a baseline sentence. 65
Determining a final sentence. Working from a baseline sentence, a final sentence is then 
derived. According to the guidelines, a baseline sentence, either within or below statu-
tory ranges in the Criminal Law, could be used directly as a final sentence.66 However, to 
determine a final sentence, a sentencing judge usually has to make adjustments to a 
baseline sentence by considering a variety of mitigating and aggravating factors or cir-
cumstances. The guidelines quantify 14 common mitigating and aggravating factors. The 
mitigating factors include being underage, voluntarily returning stolen property, volun-
tarily recompensing victims for their lost and damaged property, voluntarily surrender-
ing to police authorities, having obtained forgiveness from crime victims, and admitting 
a criminal offence during a trial. The aggravating factors are being a repeat offender, 
previously having a criminal record, the victim of the crime being an elderly person, a 
disabled person, or a pregnant woman, and committing a crime during a period of natural 
disaster and outbreak of disease.67
According to the guidelines, the presence of one or more of these mitigating or aggra-
vating factors would result in the quantum of a baseline sentence being reduced or 
Lin 367
increased.68 However, the SPC indicates that the presence of mitigating factors does not 
automatically lead to a sentence reduction for serious offences that are punishable by life 
imprisonment or the death penalty, such as organized criminal activity and serious vio-
lent crimes.69 This suggests that less serious offenders may benefit more from the pres-
ence of the mitigating factors than serious offenders would.
According to the guidelines, in order to find a fitting final sentence, a presiding judge 
could also, based on ‘local conditions or specific circumstance’, make adjustments in 
either reducing or increasing a baseline sentence up to 20 percent. The local specific 
circumstance could include the concerns of public safety conditions, social stability, and 
the extent of social harmfulness of the offences.70 However, after the adjustments, if a 
baseline sentence is still disproportional to the offence, the adjudication committee of the 
court shall decide the final sentence.71 This indicates that a presiding judge may not have 
complete autonomy in determining a final sentence.
Discussion and conclusion
The SPC and many local courts found that the implementation of the new sentencing 
procedures and guidelines did not significantly reduce the severity of punishments 
imposed by the judges (a fear of the SPC). At the same time, both transparency in the 
sentencing process and consistency in sentencing dispositions have significantly 
improved as the sentences imposed by judges are now more likely to be accepted by 
defendants and the public. This positive assessment of the new procedures and guide-
lines is supported by a significant decline in the number of appeals against the sentences 
imposed.72 Although the new sentencing procedures and guidelines could entail some 
improvements in China’s sentencing practice, there are a number of serious problems 
with the current sentencing reforms.
In terms of the sentencing process, the new sentencing procedures introduce some 
degree of transparency and procedural fairness into the process by granting defendants, 
prosecutors, and crime victims the right to participate in sentencing decision-making and 
by requiring the sentencing judges to justify the sentences imposed.73 This being said, 
there are still several concerns about the sentencing process in China: (1) the new sen-
tencing process is not completely separated from the trial process, which implies that the 
defendants could be forced to provide sentencing-related information in the trial process 
while arguing a case with a not-guilty plea; (2) judges do not have judicial independence 
to determine final sentences; rather, the judicative committee of a court and the court 
president decide final sentences; (3) prosecutors may play a more significant role than 
the defendant in the sentencing decision-making process; and (4) the sentencing princi-
ples encourage judges to take into consideration public opinion and local social and 
political situations in their sentencing decision-making. This may subject the sentencing 
process to political expediency.
Concerning the sentencing guidelines, the new methodology for sentence calculation 
and the starting-point approach may help structure judges’ sentencing discretion and 
therefore achieve greater consistency in sentencing dispositions. However, one must 
bear in mind that reforming China’s sentence calculation is a complex undertaking whose 
outcomes remain to be accurately reported and empirically assessed. On the one hand, 
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sentencing judges will probably benefit from the specific guidance on calculations of 
various sentencing components leading to a final sentence, and from detailed quantifica-
tion of various related factors. On the other hand, given the extremely broad ranges of 
penalties prescribed for various offences in the Criminal Law, sentencing judges may 
continue to face difficulties in meting out just and consistent sentences.
It is important to stress consistency in sentencing dispositions in the interest of justice 
in any jurisdiction, especially in the Chinese context of fighting against pervasive local 
protectionism and judicial corruption. However, for Chinese judicial authority, sentenc-
ing consistency is relative, not absolute. This implies that sentencing consistency could 
be upheld only in a given region and at a given time period, not across different regions 
and at different time periods. In this way, sentencing consistency would reflect local 
social and economic realities; the sentences imposed on the offenders could be more 
readily justified to the local public, and punishing criminals could be conducive to local 
social harmony and stability, as well as economic development.74 This partially explains 
why China has some extremely flexible sentencing principles, which allow judges to 
take into account local social and economic conditions in sentencing decision-making. 
This flexible local-specific definition of sentencing consistency serves the politics of 
stability at the expense of developing nationwide criteria for sentencing consistency and 
uniformity. In the long run, it may also undermine the confidence of the public in the 
criminal process. Due to the close connection between sentencing consistency and local 
realities, the SPC indicates that the sentencing guidelines provide only ‘general’ guid-
ance in determining sentences. Based on local social and economic conditions, High 
People’s Courts in various provinces and regions should develop their own more detailed 
and location-specific sentencing guidelines. Nevertheless, localized sentencing guide-
lines developed by provincial higher courts must be filed with the SPC.75 Following this 
SPC directive, almost all provincial High People’s Courts in China have drafted their 
own sentencing guidelines for their local courts.
It also has to be pointed out that the new sentence calculation methods tend to focus 
on meting out sentences for the purpose of protecting society, instead of punishing 
offenders by taking into consideration the characteristics of the offenders and the circum-
stances of the offences. Some Chinese jurists are concerned that the guidelines may leave 
judges too little sentencing discretion. As a result, no principled approach in sentencing 
is possible and sentencing outcomes are more likely to be generalized sentences rather 
than individualized punishment. The latter is important for achieving specific justice and 
rehabilitation of offenders, and for reducing recidivism.76
It is important to note that the sentencing procedural rules and guidelines issued by 
the SPC are judicial directives, not statutory legislation; but in practice, it is mandatory 
for local courts to implement these procedural rules and guidelines in the sentencing 
process. This is consistent with the SPC’s usual practice of using its power of judicial 
directives or interpretations to provide what the National People’s Congress (NPC), 
China’s national legislature, is either too slow or incapable of providing: timely legal 
changes in response to China’s fast-changing social and economic conditions.77 Chinese 
jurists have long recognized this problem of the SPC’s constitutionally dubious practice, 
and in this case they characterize the SPC’s sentencing procedures and guidelines as 
‘quasi-legislation’ or ‘judicial legislation or lawmaking’.78 Some jurists have rightly 
Lin 369
pointed out that the SPC has stepped outside the realm of judicial interpretation in its 
sentencing reforms and has infringed upon the legislative authority of the NPC.79 
Nevertheless, many Chinese jurists express their willingness to accept the SPC’s exer-
cise of legislative power in this case, even though it is constitutionally illegitimate. For 
them, the new sentencing procedures and guidelines have advanced China’s sentencing 
practice in a positive direction. One jurist pragmatically explains that, in an ideal situa-
tion, sentencing reforms as such should be conducted by the NPC. But the NPC probably 
does not possess the expertise and resources required for the reforms. Therefore, it is 
acceptable for the SPC to establish the sentencing procedures and guidelines through 
judicial interpretations.80
One of the most disappointing aspects of the current sentencing reforms is that the new 
sentencing guidelines can be applied only to less serious offences, not to the serious 
crimes punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty.81 Currently, the use of the 
capital punishment in China is still the most controversial issue concerning sentencing 
reforms, especially in light of the recent revelation that some defendants were wrongfully 
convicted of capital offences. The use of the death penalty urgently needs guidance.82 In 
fact, sentencing guidelines for capital offences could be helpful in restricting and reducing 
the use of death punishment. Researchers in the SPC indicate that the sentencing guide-
lines for life imprisonment and the death penalty will be developed and provided when the 
SPC acquires more experience in composing sentencing guidelines.83
The preceding discussions suggest that the current sentencing reform has many limi-
tations: it is incomplete, tentative, experimental in nature, and has only limited applica-
tion. These limitations are primarily due to the SPC’s competing priorities for sentencing 
justice and for social stability maintenance. On the one hand, the SPC realizes the neces-
sity and urgency to reform the sentencing process, and to set limits in the sentencing 
guidelines for judges’ sentencing discretion. On the other hand, the SPC’s political man-
date as set forth by the party-state requires that sentencing reform must be carried out in 
a manner that is conducive to maintaining social stability. In fact, the SPC’s concern with 
social stability has created obstacles for the sentencing justice reform and impaired its 
outcomes.
Some Western scholars are critical of the restricted effects of China’s political envi-
ronment on criminal justice reforms.84 Susan Trevaskes and others express concerns with 
the overwhelming role played by ‘the political imperative of social stability’ in China’s 
legal reforms in the recent decade and that ‘the stability agenda of politics overtake rou-
tine law and justice concerns’.85 In the current sentencing reform, the politics of stability 
maintenance partially helped initiate the reforms. It was the SPC and the party-state’s 
concerns with inconsistent sentencing outcomes and non-transparent sentencing process 
(causing popular discontent with the criminal justice and judicial system) that first gave 
the SPC the impetus to start the sentencing reform.86 However, the SPC’s concerns with 
politics in turn sets a limit on the extent of the reform. Regardless of sentencing reforms, 
the criminal process must remain effective in the crackdown on serious offenders whose 
criminal activities could undermine social stability. Accordingly, the sentencing guide-
lines contain vague and ambiguous sentencing principles and are only applicable to less 
serious crimes. The limited applicability of the guidelines suggests that the SPC is reluc-
tant to set definite parameters and limits that may tie its hands in punishing serious 
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offenders. The ambiguous sentencing principles also allow the courts flexibility in using 
punishment for social stability.
The current sentencing reform sets another example whereby criminal justice reform 
in China continues to be restricted by China’s instrumentalist approach to law and by the 
politics of stability.87 There is still much that needs to be done before China can boast of 
a sentencing process that is fair, transparent, and consistent in its sentencing dispositions. 
Nevertheless, China’s current efforts to develop and use sentencing procedural rules and 
the guidelines constitute a significant first step in its quest for fair, just, and consistent 
sentencing outcomes.
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